In the great climactic battle of the Spanish-American War, the Spanish fleet attempted to break out of Santiago harbor on July 3, 1898. The move was a desperate bid to escape the blockade forces of the U.S. Navy. The U.S. fleet commander, Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, had left Commodore Winfield Scott Schley in command of the blockade while he sailed in his flagship to a meeting with the commanding U.S. general ashore. This was the moment chosen by the Spanish to charge out of the harbor.
The battle at sea ended quickly enough with the total defeat of the Spanish fleet. But for the U.S. Navy, the battle for glory had only just begun. Who was the real hero of Santiago de Cuba? The controversy would be fought out in public, inflamed by the press. In 1901 Edgar S. Maclay would charge Schley with cowardice in the third volume of his History of the United States Navy. Schley asked for a court of inquiry on his conduct of the battle, and the findings of the court would not be kind to the commodore. Schley appealed to President Theodore Roosevelt, who called for an end to the public dispute.
To a young cadet at the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Chester Nimitz, the controversy was nothing less than traumatic. The future commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet during the Second World War made a vow that, if he was ever in a position to prevent it, there would be no washing of the Navy's dirty laundry in public. Nimitz may not have been the only future commander to be so effected by the Sampson-Schley controversy.
In June 1944, forces under the command of Nimitz conducted an amphibious operation to capture the island of Saipan in the Pacific's Mariana Islands. In overall command of the operation was the Fifth Fleet's Admiral Raymond Spruance; the fleet was made up of an amphibious force and a force of aircraft carriers, the latter, Task Force 58, was commanded by Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher. In response to the invasion of Saipan, the Japanese Navy sent its carriers out to fight for the first time in more than 18 months.
The operational order given by Nimitz to Spruance was to "capture, occupy and defend Saipan, Tinian, and Guam and develop bases in those islands." The Fifth Fleet commander viewed this as his primary responsibility, and in the face of sighting reports by U.S. submarines, which presented the picture of a divided enemy fleet, he ordered Mitscher to keep his carriers close to Saipan to protect the forces ashore. Mitscher had his own ideas on how to handle the enemy fleet, and developed plans to sail west, close with the enemy and force an engagement on his terms.
Spruance exercised his authority and kept the carriers in a position to defend against a possible end run against the beaches. The Mitscher's carriers were forced to fight a defensive battle against air strikes launched by the enemy carriers. The better trained pilots of Task Force 58 scored a tremendous victory against the inexperienced Japanese fliers. The following day, Mitscher pursued the enemy fleet and launched a strike which caught the Japanese carriers at dusk, and sank one flattop. While the Battle of the Philippine Sea was a victory for the U.S. Navy, it could have been a bigger victory had Mitscher been allowed to sail out to meet the enemy rather than fight a defensive battle.
A few weeks after the battle, Mitscher's chief of Staff, Captain Arleigh Burke wrote up the after action report on the battle. Burke wrote the narrative portion himself, and then took it to his admiral, recommending that he read at least the final two pages since they were critical of Admiral Spruance.
Mitscher was of a mind to trust his chief of staff's version of events -- having fought the battle, he assumed that he knew what was in the report. But, at Burke's insistence, he read the last two pages.
"It's all true, all right," said the admiral when he had finished. Then he stared out over the lagoon at Eniwetok, where his force was resting and regrouping. "Do you know Admiral Spruance very well?" he finally asked.
"Yes, sir."
"What do you think of him?"
"I think he's a might good man, but he made a mistake this time, Admiral. He made a big mistake. I don't know why he did it, but it was a big mistake. This is true."
"Yes, it's all true," said Mitscher, "but what good is it going to do to send in a report like this?"
"It tells the truth."
"You don't think the truth does more harm than good sometimes?"
"No, sir."
"Well, it does," replied Mitscher. "You and I have been in many battles, and we know there are always some mistakes. This time we were right because the enemy did what we expected him to do. Admiral Spruance could have been right. He's one of the finest officers I know of. It was his job to protect the landing force. Anyway, the ultimate outcome of this war is decided by now, and it's not going to make that much difference. Don't you think you ought to take it back and rewrite those last two pages?"
"No, sir," answered Burke, "but I will."
Many U.S. Navy aviators, along with a few historians, would not be as generous as Mitscher, branding the battle as one of the biggest blunders of the war, if not the century. Admiral John H. Towers, an aviator and deputy to Nimitz as Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, demanded that Spruance be relieved of his command for his handling of the battle. Nimitz ignored the demand and defended the Fifth Fleet commander's strategy, then and later. Though Spruance faced criticism, the U.S. Navy was largely spared the kind of public controversy that the Battle of Santiago Bay had produced.
In the recent general conference of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Elder David A. Bednar spoke on the subject of meekness and recounted the example of Pahoran:
"During a perilous period of war described in the Book of Mormon, an exchange of epistles occurred between Moroni, the captain of the Nephite armies, and Pahoran, the chief judge and governor of the land. Moroni, whose army was suffering because of inadequate support from the government, wrote to Pahoran “by the way of condemnation” and accused him and his fellow leaders of thoughtlessness, slothfulness, neglect, and even being traitors.
"Pahoran easily might have resented Moroni and his inaccurate allegations, but he did not. He responded compassionately and described a rebellion against the government about which Moroni was not aware. And then Pahoran declared:
“'Behold, I say unto you, Moroni, that I do not joy in your great afflictions, yea, it grieves my soul. …
“'… In your epistle you have censured me, but it mattereth not; I am not angry, but do rejoice in the greatness of your heart.'
"What do you think explains Pahoran’s measured reply to Moroni’s accusations?"
What may help us understand why Pahoran reacted as he did?
"Meekness is a defining attribute of the Redeemer and is distinguished by righteous responsiveness, willing submissiveness, and strong self-restraint. . . . The Christlike quality of meekness often is misunderstood in our contemporary world. Meekness is strong, not weak; active, not passive; courageous, not timid; restrained, not excessive; modest, not self-aggrandizing; and gracious, not brash. A meek person is not easily provoked, pretentious, or overbearing and readily acknowledges the accomplishments of others."
Elder Bednar concluded by noting that meekness "is an essential aspect of the divine nature and can be received and developed in our lives because of and through the Savior’s Atonement." Then he promised that the Savior "will guide, protect, and strengthen us as we walk in the meekness of His Spirit."
We live in a world where controversies of the Sampson-Schley type are common, and where the restraint of Nimitz and Mitscher are rare. I wonder, though, if anything is really accomplished by these battles over truth.
As Admiral Mitscher suggested, Admiral Spruance's conduct of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, sound or unsound, made little difference to the outcome of the Pacific War, because that outcome had already been decided. Because enough of the Japanese fleet escaped damage, there would be another major battle to fight, but Japan's fate was already sealed by the battles and campaigns that had already taken place.
Sampson had prepared his fleet well, and under Schley's tactical command it performed well in battle. If Schley made mistakes during the fight, they were of little consequence. The controversy that followed the battle tarnished rather than polished both men, and it gave the Navy a black eye.
Excessive, ungracious, self-aggrandizing controversy does not serve truth, which will prevail with or without our help. Stand up for truth, yes, but do so with meekness.
Sources:
Potter, E. B. (1976). Nimitz. Annapolis, MD: Naval Instititute Press
Potter, E. B. (1990). Admiral Arleigh Burke. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press
Bednar, D. A. (2018) "Meek and Lowly of Heart". Accessed 4/16/2018 at LDS.org: https://www.lds.org/general-conference/2018/04/meek-and-lowly-of-heart?lang=eng
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